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ABSTRACT. At present the term ‘trauma’ seems to be booming as a pattern of cultural in-
terpretation. It connects discourses about medicine, psychoanalysis, art and literary theory, 
and social history. Today the ruptures and aporias of understanding, representation, com-
municability and referentiality are discussed in post-structuralist theories of meaning, but 
it was Freud who created for the first time a readable text about how the repetitious struc-
ture of trauma in its paradoxical temporality – the effect stands in as its cause – works as a 
missed experience at the interface of lives and texts. 
Trauma opens up a space beyond the symbolic and interrupts thereby 
the very process of memory. Both psychoanalysis and literature try to make 
traumatic experience available for symbolic exchange, not by means of ex-
cavating a lost and objectifiable past but by the very act of repeating what 
otherwise – without the ‘significant other’ – would undergo the crisis of 
silence. 
If «modernity names the moment when the thinking subject can no 
longer be said to be completely under control or conscious of the actual 
events that necessarily comprise “his” past»1, then it was Freud who created 
for the first time a readable text of this missing experience. Thus memory 
has become the place where the unexpected and the accidental could hap-
pen, threatening the subject’s coherence and continuity. In the face of 
                                                     
1 Kevin Newmark: Traumatic Poetry: Charles Baudelaire and the shock of laughter. In: 
Cathy Caruth (ed.): Trauma. Explorations in Memory. Baltimore and London: John Hop-
kins UP 1995, p. 236-255; 238. 
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World War I Freud was startled by the dreams of the war veterans. The 
dream images were not symbolic; rather they repeated mimetically the bat-
tlefield traumas: 
Now dreams occurring in traumatic neuroses have the characteristic 
of repeatedly bringing the patient back to the situation of his accident, 
a situation from which he wakes up in another fright. This astonishes 
people far too little.2 
The literal return of these traumatic dreams could no longer be under-
stood as “wish fulfilment” and seemed to lack any unconscious meaning: 
[…] it is impossible to classify as wish-fulfilments the dreams we have 
been discussing which occur in traumatic neuroses, or the dreams dur-
ing psychoanalyses which bring to memory the psychical traumas of 
childhood. They arise, rather, in obedience to the compulsion to re-
peat, though it is true that in analysis that compulsion is supported by 
the wish (which is encouraged by “suggestion”) to conjure up what 
has been forgotten and repressed. Thus it would seem that the func-
tion of dreams, which consists in setting aside any motives that might 
interrupt sleep, by fulfilling the wishes of the disturbing impulses, is 
not their original function. If there is a “beyond the pleasure principle”, 
it is only consistent to grant that there was also a time before the pur-
pose of dreams was the fulfilment of wishes.3 
In Beyond the Pleasure Principle Freud introduces trauma through the no-
tion of a nightmare. The dream reproduces the catastrophe and the shock 
experience stands for the dissociation of memory from consciousness; the 
actual event is separated from its understanding. The traumatized individual 
is possessed by the event and does not gain any control over it. He cannot 
possess his history. At the core of the nightmares there is a collapse of 
                                                     
2 Sigmund Freud: Beyond the Pleasure Principle. In: The Standard Edition of the Com-
plete Works of Sigmund Freud. Volume XVIII (1920-1922): Beyond the Pleasure Princi-
ple, Group Psychology and Other Works. Translated from the German under the General 
Editorship of James Strachey. In Collaboration with Anna Freud. Assisted by Alix Strachey 
and Alan Tyson. London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psychoanalysis 2001, pp. 
7-64; 13. 
3 Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, p. 32f. [Freud’s emphasis]. 
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meaning and a deep uncertainty as to its very truth. The crisis of truth poses 
the greatest challenge to trauma theory today. 
Besides the non-symbolic character of the dreams and flashbacks, Freud 
was also struck by the belatedness with which the traumatic event haunted 
the one who had suffered from it, possibly a long time ago. In Moses and 
Monotheism he refers to this gap of knowing as a period of latency that con-
stitutes a time that lacks the registration of the traumatic event in memory: 
It may happen that a man who has experienced some frightful acci-
dent – a railway collision, for instance – leaves the scene of the event 
apparently uninjured. In the course of the next few weeks, however, 
he develops a number of severe psychical and motor symptoms which 
can only be traced to his shock, the concussion or whatever else it 
was. He now has a “traumatic neurosis”. […] The time that has passed 
between the accident and the first appearance is described as the “in-
cubation period”, in a clear allusion to the pathology of infectious dis-
eases. […] that might be described as “latency”.4 
It is because of this very belatedness that the trauma tests the limits of 
understanding. Freud had already identified the principle of belatedness in 
his case studies with hysterical patients. He argued that the traumatic inter-
action takes place between two scenes. 
The first scene – consisting of the initial traumatic moment – is not fully 
emotionally experienced and intellectually understood, but can only be lived 
through at the time of its occurrence. It cannot be grasped because it comes 
too early in the child’s development to be assimilated. The second scene – 
sometimes a rather trivial trigger – could reactivate the first after a period 
of latency. With regard to sexual child abuse as depicted in the Katharina-
case, Freud posits that the actual abuse in childhood has no meaning to the 
                                                     
4 Sigmund Freud: Moses and Monotheism: Three Essays. In: The Standard Edition of 
the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. Volume XXIII (1937-1939): Moses 
and Monotheism. An Outline of Psychoanalysis and Other Works. Translated from the 
German under the General Editorship of James Strachey. In Collaboration with Anna 
Freud. Assisted by Alix Strachey and Alan Tyson. London: The Hogarth Press and the 
Institute of Psycho-Analysis 2001, pp. 1-13; 67f. 
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child, even though it has sexual content. It is only after puberty that the 
adolescent – through a second scene that is in some relation to the first one 
– realizes the sexual meaning of the first experience. And it is only from this 
“belated” point that traumatization sets in: It is the second scene that makes 
the first scene “retrospectively” traumatic. This paradoxical temporality – 
the effect stands in as its cause – is a radically hermeneutic concept. 
Through the logic of belatedness, deferred action or retro-determination 
traumatic experience breaks with common patterns of chronology: the past 
is belatedly created and may even project itself into the future through the 
compulsion to repeat. Freud, in his paper on Screen Memories, had already 
refused purely chronological models of remembering, and memory’s capac-
ity for saving facts “as they were” became subject to the most suspicious 
examination: «There is in general no guarantee of the data produced by our 
memory»5. – «I can assure you», he says, «that people often construct such 
things unconsciously – almost like works of fiction»6. As to screen memo-
ries, an early memory can be used as a screen for a later event or vice versa, 
according to whether the displacement has occurred in a backward or for-
ward direction: 
A screen memory may be described as “retrogressive” or as having 
“pushed forward” according as the one chronological relation or the 
other holds between the screen and the thing screened off. […] The 
whole subject deserves a more thorough examination; but I must con-
tent myself with pointing out what complicated processes – processes, 
incidentally, which are altogether analogous to the formation of hys-
terical symptoms – are involved in the building up of our store of 
memories.7 
                                                     
5 Sigmund Freud: Screen Memories. In: The Standard Edition of the Complete Works 
of Sigmund Freud. Volume III (1893-1899): Early Psychoanalytic Publications. Translated 
from the German under the General Editorship of James Strachey. In Collaboration with 
Anna Freud. Assisted by Alix Strachey and Alan Tyson. London: The Hogarth Press and 
the Institute of Psychoanalysis 2001, pp. 301-322; 315. 
6 Freud, Screen Memories, p. 315. 
7 Freud, Screen Memories, p. 320. 
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Though inhabiting a time before time, we are destined to miss a direct 
encounter with our own past. The past in general, and in particular if it is 
traumatic, seems to be beyond the scope of our memory. Psychoanalysis, 
therefore, would prove itself ineffective if it wanted to restore the subject’s 
integrity by means of excavating a lost and objectifiable past. Only repeti-
tion can commemorate the trauma. 
Post-structuralist theories of meaning maintain that trauma is beyond 
the limits of representation. There is no way to bridge what is so radically 
torn apart. The ruptures and aporias of understanding, representation, com-
municability and referentiality have come to form the centre of deconstruc-
tive approaches towards trauma. In her paper on Trauma and the Material 
Signifier Linda Belau warns against giving way to the temptation to idealize 
traumatic experience as something radically inaccessible: 
[…] if trauma’s seeming incomprehensibility has been the paradoxical 
starting point for one of the most important avenues of its study, it 
has also invited a dangerous elevation of traumatic experience to the 
level of an ideal. That is, insofar as it remains beyond our understand-
ing and comprehension, trauma can easily be seen as a sort of excep-
tional experience. And victims and survivors of trauma, consequently, 
may be seen as ambassadors of an exceptional realm, bearers of a 
higher (albeit more terrible) knowledge than is available to the rest of 
us.8 
Belau argues that traumatic experience is not in fact inaccessible or un-
touchable to the degree deconstructivist trauma theory claims. Trauma, to 
her, inhabits a space beyond the symbolic which is, nevertheless, intimately 
tied to the materiality of the signifier. Through an analysis of the role of the 
signifier it could be shown that trauma – in exposing the inadequacy of the 
signifier – «is an effect of the real that can only be registered negatively in 
the symbolic». «Therefore», she concludes, «while trauma may belong to the 
register of the real, it functions in the symbolic»9. It is the symbolic where 
traumatic repetition stages itself. 
                                                     
8 Linda Belau: Trauma and the Material Signifier. 2001,1, LINK. 
9 Belau, Trauma and the Material Signifier, 46. 
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Trauma opens up a space beyond the symbolic and interrupts thereby 
the very process of memory. Psychoanalysis and literature both try to make 
traumatic experience available for symbolic exchange, not by means of ex-
cavating a lost past but by the very act of repeating what otherwise – with-
out the “significant other” – would undergo the crisis of silence. 
Metaphor and metonymy are two forms of symbolic representation. Ac-
cording to Arnold Modell, a psychoanalyst and professor of clinical  psy-
chiatry, the loss of metaphor as it occurs in post-traumatic states is a «char-
acteristic response to trauma and it threatens the integrity of the self»10. 
Traumatization compels the subject to repeat an unmodified literality from 
the past without being able to re-categorize or re-contextualize the return-
ing memories. Modell describes this situation in terms of a “frozen meta-
phor”: «The metaphoric correspondence between past and present is fro-
zen and inflexible. […] Trauma degrades metaphor, and massive trauma 
degrades metaphor absolutely»11. Interrupting the process of symbolization, 
the traumatic past remains isolated, it cannot become part of the present in 
such a way that the traumatized individual can reflect on it. Donnel B. Stern, 
referring to Modell, emphasizes the need for trauma to be linked with cur-
rent experiences if any sort of “meaning” is to be kept alive: 
In trauma, that is, the past exists as a concrete record and cannot be 
contextualized in the present. Note that this drains meaning from the 
present, because the present cannot be enriched by association with 
some portion of the past. But the foreclosing of metaphor also drains 
meaning from the past – or rather, from the reconstructions of the 
past that we undertake on the basis of what we learn and experience 
in the present, a process analogous to what Freud (1895, 1918) called 
deferred action, or Nachträglichkeit.12 
                                                     
10 Arnold H. Modell (2003), Imagination and the Meaningful Brain. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, p. 113. 
11 Modell, Imagination and the Meaningful Brain, p. 113. 
12 Donnel B. Stern (2009): Shall the Twain Meet? Metaphor, Dissociation, and 
Cooccurrence. In: Psychoanalytic Inquiry: A Topical Journal for Mental Health Profes-
sionals, 29:1, pp. 79-90; 82. [Italics from the original]. 
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By means of our metaphoric imagination, we are able to interpret, dis-
place, and transform our feelings. In metaphor, the meaning of a memory, 
Stern says, is carried over or “transferred” to a present experience and also 
becomes part of the “emotional categories”. The self also needs to be con-
tinually re-contextualized in an affective dimension. When such metaphoric 
transfer takes place trauma can be reflected on. 
There is also an interesting relationship between transference (in the psy-
choanalytical sense of the term) and metaphor. Psychotic reference lacks 
symbolism and flattens any metaphors to a plain concretism13. Stern gives 
the following example: 
[…] my analyst is my father; no other interpretation will do. Clinical 
relatedness is much more viable, of course, if the transference is (again 
in the old-school term) neurotic: I feel that my analyst is like my father, 
but I continue to recognize that analyst and father are separate. Trans-
ference is clinically useful when its meaning is metaphorical; transfer-
ence is problematic, on the other hand, when it is a literal equivalence. 
Transference will not collapse when there is an “as if” which creates the 
potential for metaphor: 
To feel as if my father is my analyst, I must feel that the two people 
are alike in some key respect. In other words, the as if kind of trans-
ference requires me to have created a category in which father and ana-
lyst both belong. But the creation of a category is based on more than 
the identification of similarities between its items; a category is also 
defined by its items’ differences from one another. Without the dif-
ferences to separate the members of a category, it would not be a cat-
egory at all, but would instead simply collapse back into equiva-
lences.14 
Metaphor, for this reason, is not purely a linguistic phenomenon but 
synonymous with symbolic function. Trauma that has not yet become part 
                                                     
13 The loss of metaphor threatens memory. See also Ilse Grubrich-Simitis, «From Con-
cretism to Metaphor: Thoughts on Some Theoretical and Technical Aspects of the Psy-
choanalytic Work with Children of Holocaust Survivors», Psychoanalytic Study of the Child 39 
(1984), pp. 301-319. 
14 Stern, Shall the Twain Meet?, p. 81. [Italics from the original]. 
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of a metaphor does not belong to a category either. Remaining in isolation 
as a “singularity”, as a thing in itself, it cannot be known or emotionally felt. 
According to Stern, it «seems […] that the process of creating associative 
links between otherwise separate experiences is crucial to psychic growth»15. 
The literalness of language makes memory impossible. – «Take metaphor 
out of language and there is no memory, no history, left»16. If an experience 
lacks all reference points it stays empty and can only be represented as a 
loss, gap or void. Dori Laub uses the term “empty circle” for this «latent, 
but powerful and ever-present feeling of nothingness»17 after one of his an-
alytic patients had told him a dream which occurred in the fifth year of her 
analysis. The short version of it runs as follows: 
[T]here was an “empty circle”; she knew that her position could be re-
lated to that circle. Exactly where she was, she did not know, but she 
felt her reference to it. Many things distracted her from looking at it.18 
Through the absence of categories the dream experience as well as the 
real trauma experience is surrounded by timelessness and ubiquity. Without 
time and place the traumatic event is «outside the range of associatively 
linked experiences, outside the range of comprehension, of recounting and 
of mastery»19. Trauma blocks the conversion into narrative. Whereas nar-
rating our life stories is a social act, related to a particular addressee and 
adapted to the interests of the present, traumatic memory remains un-
touched by time and cannot be recounted verbally. It is encapsulated in the 
body and cut off from consciousness and the understanding “other”: 
                                                     
15 Stern, Shall the Twain Meet?, p. 83. 
16 Jacqueline Rose: «Daddy». In: Sylvia Plath. Edited and with an Introduction by Har-
old Bloom. Updated edition. (= Bloom’s Modern Critical Views). New York: Bloom’s Lit-
erary Criticism 2007, p. 28. 
17 Dori Laub and Daniel Podell: Art and Trauma. In: International Journal of Psycho-
Analysis (1995) 76, p. 991-1005; 992. 
18 Laub/Podell, Art and Trauma, p. 992. 
19 Dori Laub: Bearing Witness or the Vicissitudes of Listening. In: Shoshana Felman 
and Dori Laub (ed.): Testimony. Crisis of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis and 
History. New York and London: Routledge 1992, pp. 57-74; 69. 
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The feelings of absence, of rupture, and of the loss of representation 
that essentially constitute the traumatic experience all emerge from the 
real failure of the empathic dyad at the time of the traumatisation and 
the resulting failure to preserve an empathic tie even with oneself.20 
When faith in human responsiveness has to be entirely given up – «[t]he 
executioner does not heed the victim’s plea for life and relentlessly proceeds 
with the execution»21 – also the internal dialogue within the victim is de-
stroyed, as intra-psychically there is no longer «a matrix of two people, a 
self and a resonating other»22. Therefore the presence of a listener is of es-
sential importance to restore the empathic tie within the survivor herself. 
Literature and psychoanalysis can provide a kind of transitional space 
for a responsive presence to make up for the tremendous loss of empathy 
during traumatization. 
Donald W. Winnicott23 holds that our fear of death is indissolubly 
linked to our earliest experiences of loneliness, helplessness and separa-
tion. The infant’s separation anxieties from her first carer, usually the 
mother, cause her unbearable pain and suffering that cannot be processed 
properly by the immaturity of her psyche. Transitional objects like blan-
kets and teddy bears help the child to have a fantasized bond with the 
mother as she gradually separates. But language too can serve as a defence 
against anxiety. 
Freud gave an impressive example watching his grandson playing a game 
of departure and return: 
The child had a wooden reel with a piece of string tied round it. It 
never occurred to him to pull it along the floor behind him, for in-
stance, and play at its being a carriage. What he did was to hold the 
                                                     
20 Laub/Podell, Art and Trauma, p. 992. 
21 Dori Laub: On Holocaust Testimony and Its «Reception» within Its Own Frame, as 
a Process in Its Own Right. A Response to «Between History and Psychoanalysis» by 
Thomas Trezise. In: History and Memory, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Spring/Summer 2009), pp. 127-
150; 141. 
22 Laub (2009), p. 141. 
23 D. W. Winnicott (1971): Playing and reality. New York: Routledge. 
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reel by the string and very skillfully throw it over the edge of his cur-
tained cot, so that it disappeared into it, at the same time uttering his 
expressive “o-o-o-o”. He then pulled the reel out of the cot again by 
the string and hailed its reappearance with a joyful “da” [“there”]. 
This, then, was the complete game – disappearance and return.24 
In his “fort”-“da” game, the little boy has created a transitional symbolic 
space between his mother and himself which allows him to maintain the 
mother-child bond by staging her departure and her coming back as well. 
By means of the reel the boy could stand separateness while remaining sym-
bolically connected to his mother’s embrace. 
The same takes place when the analyst attempts to restore or reconstruct 
a patient’s damaged early self through holding and transitional relatedness, 
emphasizing a renewed process of self-creation. Like the child’s play, the 
psychoanalytical process could thus be the basis for creativity. 
By means of words as transitional objects the little boy could bridge the 
otherwise empty space between himself and his mother, between the self 
and the world. The significance of the transitional object lies in the child’s 
passing from the pre-symbolic to the symbolic. Thus, the fort-da-game 
could be conceived as a primal scene of poetry. It connects and separates, 
at the same time, the child’s inner world from the external reality. In Freud’s 
terms, the transition from the pleasure principle to the reality principle takes 
place. In the intermediate area of the game, both primary and secondary 
processes coexist simultaneously. The child’s text is a symbolic object in the 
psychoanalytical sense and eases his way into reality and separation while 
playfully investigating its linguistic and symbolic capacities respectively. As 
long as you can hide in the intermediate area of play or poetic language (and 
as may also be the case with the holding containment in the psychoanalytic 
process) death cannot get you, because it is always ‘out there’ in the realm 
where you are not25. Death-camp survivors are reported to have concen-
                                                     
24 Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, p. 15. 
25 See Gabriele Schwab: The Intermediate Area Between Life and Death: On Samuel Beck-
ett’s The Unnamable. In: Memory and Desire. Aging – Literature – Psychoanalysis. Edited by 
Kathleen Woodward and Murray M. Schwartz. Bloomington: Indiana UP, pp. 204-217; 208. 
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trated on exercise books or torn sheets of paper as transitional objects (and 
therefore stabilizing devices) when gradually meaning was withdrawn from 
the last remains of life around them. The uttering of words, rhythms or the 
singing of a melody defers the notion of death. Silence, in this respect, 
would work as a linguistic substitute for death and emptiness. 
When meaning is radically lost and the internal other is utterly absent, 
art could keep up the illusion of a responsive presence. Art does not “com-
municate” meanings, but it generates them in receptive minds: 
In art and literature a connection can be restored that can oppose and 
defy the abandonment of listening and communication that character-
ises trauma. Art has the ability to revive the enshrouded past of a 
trauma through a dialogue in the present. In creating a holding, wit-
nessing “other” that confirms the reality of the traumatic event, the 
artist can provide a structure or presence that counteracts the loss of 
the internal other, and thus can bestow form on chaos.26 
Bestowing form on chaos means in some way unfolding a story that 
provides some formal containment for a plot that otherwise would iterate 
the psychic pain by inexorably and insensibly repeating itself. “Story” as 
well as Anna O.’s “talking cure” could, therefore, be regarded as a linguistic 
remedy, whereas plot or “unstory” prolongs the pain without the healing 
power of a narrative mode. Ruth Leys, in her book about the genealogy of 
trauma, links “unstory” versus “story” to the terms “mimesis” and “die-
gesis”27. Diegetic modes of representation are a step towards de-traumati-
                                                     
26 Laub/Podell, Art and Trauma, p. 993, referring to Gilbert J. Rose: Necessary Illu-
sion: Art as “Witness’. Madison, Conn.: International Universities Press 1996. 
27 Ruth Leys: Trauma. A genealogy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2000, p. 31: 
«The unconscious, for Freud, is the repository of those repressed infantile representations, 
and it is the latter that, transferred secondarily to the person of the analyst, are held to 
become accessable to consciousness and recollection in the form of the patient’s self-nar-
ration, or diegisis. For Freud in this mode, the patient’s speech during the hypnotic trance 
does not constitute such a diegisis for that speech is a hypnotic-mimetic performance that 
occurs precisely in the absence of consciousness and self-representation». [Italics from the 
original]. 
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zation, as narrating is always a kind of “working through” and therefore can 
provide a conscious, psychic and intellectual processing of trauma28. 
Literature may connect “unstory” to “story”, and by doing so, it also con-
nects the shattered pieces of a broken temporality, so that the past can be laid 
to rest. Ghost stories29 represent a paradigmatic embodiment of the disjunc-
tion of temporality, since the spectre – as a variant of the return of the re-
pressed – keeps haunting the present as long as the traumatic event has not 
been fully assimilated. To be bound to replay the past is to be caught in a 
traumatic repetition compulsion which suspends the temporal process by the 
tantalizing instinctual play of the death drive. Remembering and “working 
through” in opposition to “acting out” tries to escape this curse of reproduc-
tion. Repetition is inherently ambivalent. If it is the matrix for altering what 
is repeated, it could be a potentially progressive act. Thus the little boy’s fort-
da game stages the passage from trauma to recovery. It can be regarded as an 
attempt to create patterns of constancy. Such constancy allows something to 
remain stable. Although art and play work against the compulsion to repeat, 
insofar as they serve as symbolic enactments (they actualize the past in sym-
bolic form), they employ repetition as a means of difference and change, so 
that it can be replayed to a more successful outcome. 
Peter Brooks suggests that «repetition in its literary manifestations may 
in fact work as a “binding”, a binding of textual energies that allows them 
to be mastered by putting them into serviceable form […] within the ener-
getic economy of the narrative»30. «Serviceable form», according to Brooks, 
means “perceptible” form. These perceptible formalizations – be they repeti-
tions, similarities, or contrasting elements – create «a delay, a postponement 
in the discharge of energy, a turning back from immediate pleasure, to en-
sure that the ultimate pleasurable discharge will be more complete»31. The 
                                                     
28 Cf. Christina Wald: Hysteria, Trauma and Melancholia. Performative Maladies in 
Contemporary Anglophone Drama. New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2007, p. 99. 
29 With regard to transgenerational haunting see Anne Whitehead: Trauma Fiction. Ed-
inburgh: Edinburgh UP 2004, chapter «The past as revenant», pp. 12-29. 
30 Peter Brooks: Reading for the Plot. Design and Intention in Narrative: Oxford: Clar-
endon Press 1984, p. 101. 
31 Brooks, Reading for the Plot, p. 101f. 
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boy’s “o-o-o-o” while playing his fort-da game of departure and return 
could be seen as the vocal equivalent of the pain that the delay of the happy 
ending, his mother’s coming back, causes. The first part of the game, the 
throwing away of the spool into the infant’s cot, retards the pleasure prin-
ciple’s search for the gratification of discharge, but, nevertheless is filled 
with forepleasure, awaiting the second part of the game, the mother’s re-
turn, and welcoming it with a joyful “da”. «The most effective or, at least, 
the most challenging texts», Brooks says, «may be those that are most de-
layed, most highly bound, most painful»32. 
The boy’s desire has taken shape in the symbolic enactment of his wish-
ful play; in the same symbolic way literary texts become the fictional play-
ground for the traces of our (past) desire. The same is true of transference 
in the psychoanalytic process. 
In Brooks’ words, the transference, like the literary text, 
becomes the peculiar space of a deadly serious play, in which effect, 
repeated from the past, is acted out as if it were present, yet eventually 
in the knowledge that the persons and relations involved are surro-
gates and mummers. The transference actualizes the past in symbolic 
form, so that it can be replayed to a more successful outcome.33 
All literature, as circumlocutory it might be, is heading towards this out-
come. 
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